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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this exploratory descriptive study was to evaluate the 
participation of state governments (federation units) in the financing of sports and leisure 
public policies from 2002 to 2016. In order to better understand the regional effect of 
investment, the information was cut by region. Two central hypotheses were tested, the 
concentrator effect and the equity effect. The database was formed from the consolidated 
expenditure record registered with the National Treasury in the Accounting and Tax 
Information System of the Brazilian Public Sector - Siconfi. In order to ensure the 
comparability of tax information, the values were deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
Although there are no constraints at the level of the federation pressing the Federation 
Units to be active with regard to the sports agenda, these Units have been shown to be 
responsive to it. The overall result produces different effects between macro-regions, 
regions and Federation Units, concentrating the resources, or distributing them more 
evenly. 
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PARTICIPAÇÃO DAS UNIDADES DA FEDERAÇÃO NO INVESTIMENTO 
DAS POLÍTICAS DE ESPORTE E DE LAZER NO BRASIL 
 
RESUMO: O presente estudo de natureza descritivo exploratória teve por objetivo geral 
avaliar a participação dos governos estaduais (Unidades da Federação) no financiamento 
das políticas públicas de esporte e de lazer de 2002 a 2016. Para melhor compreensão do 
efeito regional do investimento, realizou-se o recorte das informações por região. Duas 
hipóteses centrais foram testadas, o efeito concentrador e o efeito equidade. O banco de 
dados foi formado a partir do registro do gasto consolidado registrado junto ao Tesouro 
Nacional no Sistema de Informações Contábeis e Fiscais do Setor Público Brasileiro – 
Siconfi. Para garantir a comparabilidade das informações fiscais, os valores foram 
deflacionados pelo Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPCA). Apesar de não haver 
constrangimentos no nível da federação pressionando as UF a serem ativas no que 
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resultado geral produz diferentes efeitos entre as macrorregiões, regiões e Unidades da 
Federação. Ora concentrando os recursos, ora distribuindo de forma mais equilibrada. 
 




 As in other countries, the governance system has an important impact on the way 
in which public resources are distributed. There are institutional elements that help to 
model the outcome of policies (MARCH & OLSEN, 2008; GIBSON, CALVO & 
FALLETI, 2003). Thus, it is crucial to analyse public policies in Brazil disregarding to 
the impacts of fiscal federalism, the distribution of revenues and the redistribution of the 
resources of the Union (SOARES; MELO, 2016). 
 There are few federalist states in the world and these differ greatly in the method 
of organization of government institutions. Federalism has the peculiar characteristic of 
having transformed three spheres of government into federated entities: (i) the Union 
(which corresponds to the central government), (ii) the Units of the Federation (UFs) [that 
are 27: 26 states and one Federal District], and (iii) the municipalities (that are 5,570), 
which refer to local power. Thus, Brazilian federalism created a high dispersion of 
political authority, becoming its management highly complex (ABRUCIO; FRANZESE, 
2007), and discordant with other models throughout the world (AFONSO; ARAUJO, 
2000). 
 Within the limits established by the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88), all 
entities have attributions, financial resources and the possibility of legislating on 
important themes for the management of public policies. Given the political autonomy of 
federated entities, this model creates difficulties for cooperation, since all entities have 
incentives to implement their own political agenda (ARRETCHE; VAZQUEZ & 




               , Belo Horizonte, v.23, n.4, dez/2020. 
Participation of the Federation Units in the Investment of Sports and Leisure Policies in Brazil 
Edmilson Santos dos Santos; Maria José Carvalho e Marisa Sousa 
53 
the UFs that are very unequal. The South and Southeast regions are the richest and the 
Northeast and North regions are the most vulnerable. 
 The CF/88 inaugurated, from the sports point of view, an important phase in the 
affirmation of the right to sport, since the sport was included as a right of citizens in the 
constitutional text, article 217. However, there was no adequate distribution of 
competencies between levels of government in order to support this mission (AFONSO, 
2003). Sport does not appear to be among the exclusive competences (which refer to a 
non-transferable responsibility) or common competences (the areas of which need 
cooperation in order to reduce inequality). However, and although the sport being a right 
of citizens, there is a lack of competence of the different levels of government that delays 
the application of the norm (SANTOS; FREITAS, 2015).  
 Extracted the objective responsibility of the governments, the constitution 
indicated to the legislatures the task of applying the right provided for in article 217 of 
CF/88. The sport is a theme pointed out as a competitive initiative of the three legislative 
houses. In this case, the federal, state and municipal legislatures should compete between 
them for the best offer of this right (section 9 of article 24 of CF/88). The constitution 
delegates to the federated entities the possibility of implementing the right, without any 
constraint within the federation. 
 Contrary to the expectation caused by the lack of attributions to the executive 
powers, the sport has been brought to the center of the agenda of the governments. In 
2003, for the first time in the history of Brazil, an exclusive ministry was created to 
manage the sport in the country. However, this initiative took place after many UFs and 
municipalities have already set up their own government agencies responsible for the 
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 One of the main features of the constitution was its high decentralization 
(AFONSO, 2016). The elevation of the municipality to the federation entity allowed 
many policies to be defined from the local sphere (ARRETCHE, 1999), creating 
important difficulties for the coordination of the federal government. This 
decentralization, which some call municipalization, has helped to create a huge range of 
policy initiatives to address common problems in Brazilian society. The governments of 
the UFs that were responsible for numerous finalist policies were losing space and value 
in their financing. 
 By granting autonomy to the implementation of norms in the scope of the State 
Constitutions (of the UFs), the Federal Constitution opened space for institutional 
innovation. The legislature of each UFs could call upon itself the responsibility for 
applying Art. 217 of CF/88 and institute norms that required active behavior of 
governments. In none of the UFs constitutions were established percentages of spending 
on sports. Despite the articles, paragraphs and subsections that indicate the commitment 
to the sports agenda, there is no observation in the constitutions of the UFs, regarding to 
how this should precisely occur. 
 The fiscal autonomy of the UFs has produced an imbalance in the supply capacity 
of public policies. The UFs located in the regions with the greatest economic development 
(South and Southeast) have potentially more resources to offer public policies. The UFs 
with less economic development, Northeast and North, have less resources to offer 
policies (GASPARINI; MIRANDA, 2011), and are dependent on the Union.  
In order to ensure a greater balance in the fiscal capacity of the UFs, the constitution 
created a fund that redistributed Union resources in a redistributive manner, the State 
Participation Fund (FPE)1. This fund makes an important counterpoint to the 
 
1 The Federal Constitution of 1988 established in its article 159 that the Union must distribute in a 
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concentrating power of regions and UFs of greater Gross Domestic Product (PIB). 
Therefore, it increases the spending capacity of the vulnerable regions. 
 According to Arretche (2005), the ability to spend autonomously is essential to 
understanding the formulation and implementation of public policies. Ribeiro (2006) 
announces that the analysis of government spending guarantees important information 
about its allocation priorities. The analysis of these expenditures allows a better 
understanding of the challenges posed to Brazilian federalist engineering in the provision 
of public policies. 
 In the Brazilian literature there is a lack of comparative studies within the scope 
of UFs that analyze the public policy offer of sports and leisure by this federated entity. 
The major concern of policy communities (community of specialists in public policy 
analysis of sports and leisure) are with focal analysis. The studies are concentrated in the 
UFs of greater economic development: Santa Catarina (QUINAUD; ALMEIDA, 2018; 
FURTADO et al., 2016), Paraná (MARTINS, 2004), Federal District (ATHAYDE; 
DALMAS, 2018; CARNEIRO; MASCARENHAS, 2014) and Minas Gerais (DINIZ; 
SILVA, 2016). Were also found three works from the Northeast [Pernambuco 
(BATISTA, 2005) and Bahia (SILVA; SANTANA; SILVA, 2015)] and North [Acre 
(AZEVEDO, 2014)]. 
 However, none of the studies cited above dealt exclusively with the financing of 
sports and leisure policies. The lack of studies on financing at the UF level, hinders the 
better understanding of the level of extension of the right to sport and leisure in Brazil. 
Thus, the present study was based on the following research question: does the allocative 
 
25% of IR and 49% of IPI. In Art. 161 it is established that the objective is to guarantee a greater 
socioeconomic balance of the UFs. The FPE composes those resources that are transferred to the UFs 
without conditionalities. They are intergovernmental transfers that are independent of political agreements 
and reward the most vulnerable states to the detriment of the least. Its distribution is expressed in Table 1 
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autonomy of the UFs', promoted greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of 
resources intended to public sports and leisure policies in Brazil? 
 To cover this gap, the present study intends to analyze the participation of UFs 
and regions (Figure 1) in the financing of sports and leisure public policies through the 
Sports and Leisure Function (FDL)2 budget unit. This budget unit was created in 1999 
(implemented in 2002) to aggregate the volume of investments in sports and leisure public 
policies of all federated entities. All UF's governments have bodies that are responsible 
for the implementation of public sports and leisure policies. 
Figure 1: Federation units by regions of Brazil3. 
 
 
2 The FDL was created by Ordinance No. 42 of the Ministry of Management and Budget in 1999, but was 
only implemented with the system of control of expenses of the Brazilian State [Accounting and Tax 
Information System of the Brazilian Public Sector (SICONFI)] from 2002. The FDL adds four 
subfunctions: Sports Income, Community Sports, Leisure and Other Functions of Sports and Leisure. 
3 Brazil has five regions: South (S), Southeast (SD), Midwest (CO), Northeast (ND) and North (N). Each 
region has different numbers of UFs. Were used UFs and non-states because the Brazilian State is composed 
by 26 states and one Federal District. The 27 states and Federal District (DF) compose the UFs. The 
composition of the UFs by region, according to figure 1, is as follows: South [Rio Grande do Sul (RS), 
Santa Catarina (SC) and Paraná (PR)]; Southeast [Rio de Janeiro (RJ), São Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais (MG) 
and Espírito Santo (ES)]; Center-West [Mato Grosso (MT), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), Goiás (GO) and 
DF]; Northeast (Bahia), Sergipe (SE), Pernambuco (PE), Paraíba (PB), Alagoas (AL), Rio Grande do Norte 
(RN), Ceará (CE), Piauí (PI) and Maranhão ; North (Acre (AC), Amapá (AP), Rondônia (RO), Roraima 
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 Differences in fiscal capacities are indicative that the sports and leisure agenda 
has different budget priorities, that can promote the concentration of resources in the more 
developed regions and UFs, in the case of the South and Southeast regions, and penalizing 
those with less development, North and Northeast regions. 
 Thus, the hypotheses to this study are: 
H1. Concentrator effect: The UFs pattern of FDL financing follows the production of the 
inequality expressed in the percentage distribution of the Gross Domestic Product (PIB) 
between the regions and UFs. 
H2. Redistributive effect: The pattern of FDL funding from the UFs is affected by the 




 The objective of this exploratory descriptive study was to evaluate the effect of 
the participation of state governments (the UF) in the financing of sports and leisure 
public policies from 2002 to 2016. The purpose is to determine if the autonomous 
distribution of resources by UFs, produces greater equality in the supply of public policies 
or greater inequality. The distribution of resources for sports and leisure policies was 
based on the investment made by each UF in the FDL budget function. 
 Were chosen two effects to evaluate the distribution of resources by the UFs: 
concentrator effect and redistributive effect. The concentration effect indicates the 
maintenance or expansion of the inequality in the distribution of the resources from the 
FDL to the UF. The redistributive effect indicates that the inequality has decreased.  
Considering the characteristics of Brazil, PIB promotes inequality, thus, it will be used as 
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distribution of national resources, thus, will be used as a parameter to evaluate the 
redistributive effect. If the FDL distribution approaches PIB, the effect will be 
concentrated. If approaches to the FDL, it will be redistributive. 
 From the geographic point of view, the analysis was performed: macro-region, 
region and UF. The macro-region is composed by the regions of greater economic and 
social contrast in Brazil. South and Southeast, Macro-region 1, represent those with 
greater economic and social development. The Macro-region 2 is composed by the 
regions of lesser economic and social development, the Northeast and North regions. For 
this level of analysis the Central-West region will not be incorporated, since the 
participation of the DF, UF of high economic development, would produce bias to the 
analysis. 
 As presented in Table 1, the percentage distribution of PIB concentrates resources 
in the South and Southeast regions (Macro-region 1). The South and Southeast regions 
account for 70.1% and UFs São Paulo (SP) accounts for 32.5% of the national richness. 
The Northeast and North regions (Macro-region 2) are the most vulnerable and account 
for only 19.7% of PIB. The equalization of the distribution percentages of the FDL to PIB 
will indicate the reproduction of the inequality. 
 The most vulnerable regions, Northeast and North, are responsible, for 52.13% 
and 25.57% of the distribution of FPE resources, respectively. They are responsible for 
77.7%. The least vulnerable regions, South and Southeast, are responsible respectively 
for 6.42% and 8.66% of resources. Therefore, the redistributive effect enhances the 
participation of the UFs of the Northeast and North regions and minimizes the 
participation of the more developed regions, Northeast and North. 
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of PIB and FPE by Region and UFs. 
 
Region UFs PIB FPE 
Region UFs Region UFs 
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RS 6,5 2,28 








MG 8,7 4,50 
RJ 10,2 1,62 
SP 32,5 0,97 





GO 2,9 2,87 
MS 1,5 1,35 
MT 2 2,31 





BA 4,1 9,32 
CE 2,2 7,27 
MA 1,4 7,17 
PB 0,9 4,76 
PE 2,7 6,84 
PI 0,7 4,32 
RN 1 4,14 
SE 0,6 4,11 





AM 1,4 2,93 
AP 0,2 3,42 
PA 2,2 6,13 
RO 0,6 2,86 
RR 0,2 2,48 
TO 0,5 4,28 
Source: Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
 The identification of the concentrating or redistributive effect will be based on the 
distribution percentage of the FDL between the macro regions and UFs. Considering the 
difficulty of having a symmetrical meeting between the FDL and the PIB/FPE 
percentages, an FDL modulation range of 10% for more and for less was established. 
 If PIB values fall within the modulation range, there will be a concentrating effect 
(C). If the PEF values fall within the modulation range, the effect will be redistributive 
(R). Ranging to more or less of the modulation range, the effect will deepen the inequality 
[Hyperconcentrator (HC)] or promote more equity [Hyper-distributive (HR)], as 
expressed in Table 2. 
Table 2: Effect of the Participation of the Distribution of FDL, PIB and FPE 
Between the UFs and Macroregions 1 (S/SD) and 2 (ND/N). 
PIB/FPE Macroregions FDL 
Lower Modulation Range Higher 
PIB S/SD Hyper-distributive Concentrating Hyperconcentrator 
N/ND Hyperconcentrator Concentrating Hyper-distributive 
FPE S/SD Hyper-distributive Redistributive Hyperconcentrator 
N/ND Hyperconcentrator Redistributive Hyper-distributive 
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 The aggregate data used in this study, are from different sources. The PIB was 
extracted from the IBGE and is based on the year 2016. The quota is a product of Law 
N.º 5.172 of 25.10.1966 and the percentages were compiled from Nascimento and 
Oliveira (2011). The amounts related to FDL were obtained in the website of the Brazilian 
Public Budget Accounting and Fiscal Information System (SICONFI): for the period 
from 2002 to 2012: http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/pt_PT/contas-anuais; for the 
period 2013 to 
2016:https://siconfi.tesouro.gov.br/siconfi/pages/public/consulta_finbra/finbra_list.jsf. 
The research was conducted between October 5 and 15, 2018. 
 The percentage distribution of FDL resources will be made based on the 
participation of each UFs and region from the sum of the investments of the period. To 
ensure comparability of tax information over the period (2002 to 2016), the FDL figures 
were deflated by the Consumer Price Index (IPCA). The conversion to the dollar was 
made based on the quotation of March 18, 2019: US $ 1.00 = US $ 3.78. 
 
Results 
Behaviour of UFs in FDL Investment 
 The investment volume of the UFs in the period was US $ 2.6 billion. There was 
a significant variation in the volume of resources. The three largest positive changes 
occurred in 2013 (83.29%), 2011 (77.93%) and 2006 (46.02%). The three largest negative 
changes occur in 2015 (-67.19%), 2014 (-43.24%) and 2003 (-26.68%). UFs started the 
period at US $ 64.3 million and despite variations during the period, closed the series with 
US $ 92.8 million, a real growth of 44.36%. In the year of greatest expansion of resources 
(2013), the variation considering 2002 was over 700%, which was dehydrated in the 
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 In addition, to implementing an agenda that is free of constitutional normative 
constraints, UF governments have secured increasing gains over the period. Investments 
were made in all years of the research by all UFs. This is an important fact that shows 
that for this level of government, sports and leisure play an important political role in the 
policy makers' agendas and promote access to the law. 
 As can be observed in Table 3, that indicates the percentage distribution of FDL 
in the macro-region, region and UF, the CO region affected the intraregional distribution 
of resources destined to public sports and leisure policies, producing an anomalous effect. 
The greater participation of the MT in the distribution of the FDL, (12.97%) presented an 
anomalous effect. It is responsible for the 15th position in PIB, and 8th of the FPE, thus, it 
is not among the UFs with the greatest receipt of FPE resources, but it ranks in 2nd place 
in the FDL percentage distribution ranking. 
Table 3: Percentage of FDL Investment by Region and UFs and Investment per 
Capita/Year. 
Region UFs Macroregion FDL 
Region 
(%) 







7,1 1,51 1,68 1,85 0,26 
RS 4,17 4,63 5,09 0,12 






2,20 2,44 2,68 1,46 
MG 4,70 5,22 5,74 0,43 
RJ 12,43 13,81 15,19 1,40 
SP 9,48 10,53 11,58 0,40 
Midwest 
DF   
22,37 
5,74 6,38 7,02 3,87 
GO 1,77 1,97 2,17 0,50 
MS 0,95 1,05 1,16 0,67 









0,28 0,31 0,34 0,16 
BA 7,26 8,07 8,88 0,95 
CE 6,51 7,23 7,95 1,39 
MA 1,59 1,77 1,95 0,44 
PB 0,29 0,32 0,35 0,14 
PE 3,17 3,52 3,87 0,65 
PI 0,65 0,72 0,79 0,38 
RN 0,81 0,9 0,99 0,45 





0,60 0,67 0,74 1,34 
AM 8,00 8,89 9,78 3,79 
AP 0,43 0,48 0,53 1,00 
PA 2,21 2,45 2,70 0,50 
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North RR 0,36 0,4 0,44 1,19 




 When analysing the effect of the FDL on PIB (Table 3), there was a significant 
shift of resources towards the more vulnerable Macroregion 2 (N/ND) and loss of 
microregion 1 (S/SD), more developed due to the effect of HR. This result indicates that 
there is a significant effort by the UFs of Macroregion 2 (N/ND) to produce public 
policies in percentage values, higher than their share in the percentage distribution of PIB. 
Therefore, the PIB did not pressure UFs in more developed regions, to guarantee higher 
standards of public sport policy. 
 The economic activity plays an important role in the distribution of vulnerability, 
thus, the performance of macro-regions is understandable. Considering the degree of 
development of macro-region 1 (S/SD), it is reasonable to assume that there is less 
pressure on the supply of public policies. Reverse reasoning can be performed on macro-
region 2 (N/ND), since higher percentage of vulnerable population presses for the 
increase of the social policies offer, increasing the percentage of spending with the FDL. 
Table 4: Effect of Macro-Regional Participation on FDL Distribution Compared to 
PIB and FPE. 
PIB/FPE Macrorregions FDL 
Lower Modulation Higher 
PIB S/SD HR   
N/ND   HR 
FPE S/SD   HC 
N/ND HC   
Source: Research Data. 
 As Table 4 indicates, the distribution of the FPE, has a redistributive effect, and 
seeks to compensate the most vulnerable regions with greater volume of resources 
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public policies. Despite the positive effect compared to PIB, the FPE distribution did not 
follow the redistributive effort observed in the PIB results. 
 Even the greater participation of Macroregion 2 in the distribution of FDL in 
relation to PIB, this effort was not enough to guarantee even a redistributive gain in 
relation to the FPE. Therefore, the macro-region 2 presented results lower than its 
participation in the percentage distribution of the FPE. The transfer to increase investment 
capacity did not increase investments in public sports and leisure policies. The effect was 
HC as can be observed in Table 4. The same effect was observed in Macroregion 1. This 
result indicates that the supply of public policies of sports and leisure, did not follow the 
redistributive evolution of the resources of the FPE aimed at reducing inequalities. 
 As can be observed in Table 5, regarding to PIB, the UFs of southern region were 
responsible for percentages below the wealth production (HR). This result may be a 
consequence of less pressure, due the attention to the vulnerable population. Concerning 
FPE, only the RS perceived a percentage higher than its participation in the percentage of 
FPE (HC). The UFs of PR and SC, receive less than their percentage share of the FPE, 
guaranteeing HR effect. 
In the Southeast region, two states (ES and RJ) pressed for a distribution of 
percentage of PIB, in order to improve their participation in the distribution of FDL. 
Therefore, they obtained HC effect. For the other states, the effect was HR. Regarding to 
the participation in the distribution of FPE, all the states perceived a percentage higher 
than its participation in this indicator, ensuring HC effect. 
 It is possible to observe that in the regions and macroregion 1, the UFs have 
different performances. In one hand, getting HR for PIB and HC for PEF, and, in other 
hand, presenting other effect for each indicator, as occurs in RS regarding PEF, and in ES 
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 The HC effect of RJ, as the UF with the highest percentage share in the distribution 
of FDL in macroregion 1, can be explained by its insertion in the international scenario 
of mega events, which may have pressured the increase in investments, as occurred with 
the federal government (Almeida &Marchi Jr., 2010). Rio de Janeiro hosted World 
Military Games, the Pan American Games, the Olympic Games and the World Cup. 
However, to confirm this hypothesis it would be necessary that this increase be amplified 
in the sub-function 'sport performance'. This effect is not controlled by this study. 
Table 5: Effect of the Participation of the UFs in the Distribution of FDL Compared 
to PIB and FPE. 
Region UFs Effect 
FDL/PIB FDL/FPE 
S PR HR HR 
RS HR HC 
SC HR HR 
SD ES HC HC 
MG HR HC 
RJ HC HC 
SP HR HC 
CO DF HC HC 
GO HR HR 
MS HR HR 
MT HC HC 
ND AL HC HC 
BA HR HC 
CE HR R 
MA HR HC 
PB HC HC 
PE HR HC 
PI R HC 
RN HC HC 
SE HR HC 
N AC HR HC 
AM HR HR 
AP HR HC 
PA HR HC 
RO HC HC 
RR HR HC 
TO HR HC 
                           Source: Research Data. 
 
 In the other regions (CO, ND and N), only in two occasions the variation in 
participation in the percentage distribution of FDL occurred within the modulation range, 
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present HC effect, were due to the distribution of FDL being much lower than the 
percentage participation in this indicator (region CO: DF and MT; region ND: AL, PB 
and RN; region N: RO). For the other UFs, the effect was positive (HR). Thus, the 
investments in FDL exceeded their share in the percentage distribution of PIB. 
 Regarding the comparison with the percentage distribution of FPE among the UFs, 
it was observed that in 80% of the scenarios (n=16) no R or HR effects were achieved. 
Although most of these UFs achieved HR effect, when compared to PIB, the evolution of 
resources was not enough to reach the percentage distribution of FPE. 
 The allocative behaviour among the UFs varies widely, which is well-suited with 
the characteristics of Brazilian federalism. Variables within these UFs, may, in one hand, 
impulse for greater investment in public sports and leisure policies, and sometimes in 
other hand, for a retraction in investments. As were used aggregate data on a large time 
scale, this variation may have been responsible for localized effects. However, for general 
evaluation, the results are towards allocative autonomy, where there is no constitutional 
obligation to implement the policy. The result highlights the different allocative priorities, 
as pointed out by Ribeiro (2006). 
 In agendas where there is allocative freedom, the provision of public policies tends 
to promote more developed regions to the detriment of less developed ones (AFONSO; 
LOBO, 1996). This reality has only been partially achieved. In more developed regions, 
there is a redistributive effect in relation to PIB, but it is not enough to influence the 
participation of the most vulnerable units towards the percentage distribution of FPE in 
Macroregion 2. 
 In 2004, Camargo had already advised that the spending structure of social 
policies in Brazil tends to reproduce the existing inequalities in society. From a fiscal 
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difficulties in guaranteeing equitable levels of public policy supply (COSIO; MENDES; 
MIRANDA, 2008; TER-MINASSIAN, 2012). 
 The federalist literature recognizes behavioural variation as one of the central 
characteristics of the Brazilian federalist model (SOUZA JR.; GASPARINI, 2006; 
ARRETCHE, 2005; ALMEIDA, 2005; SOUZA, 2001). Therefore, all behaviours are 
appropriate to the model, and this variation may, in some cases, deepen existing 
inequalities (ARRETCHE, 2010), as there are no tools to guarantee the provision of 
services (CAVALVANTE, 2011). 
 As budget capacity is an important trigger for investment in FDL, differences, 
especially in relation to the Southeast region, point to the existence of inequalities 
(MENDES, 2012; GIBSON; CALVO; FALLETI, 2003). Even though they were not 
expressed in the orm of deepening perceived inequalities in PIB, there were behaviours 
that did not promote greater equity. 
 On the other hand, allocative autonomy produces low incentives to increase the 
participation of UFs in the provision of public sports policies. Analysing the investment 
budget cycle of the Ministry of Sport (Union) in the 2004 and 2011 FDL, Castro (2016) 
identified that the UFs accounted for only 11.2% of the total investment. While the 
municipalities were with 48.7%. 
 In summary, the concentrating effect was not observed in relation to PIB. The 
distribution of the FDL in relation to PIB produced an effect that diminished the weight 
of the most developed regions (Macroregion 1) in the policy supply. However, this does 
not mean that internally in the region, could not have occurred opposite effect, as is the 
case of SC in the Southern region. This it was the only one with HC effect, contrary to 
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 Compared to the FPE distribution, the FDL distribution did not achieve the 
redistributive effect of the indicator. Macrorregião 1 invested more resources than its 
participation in FPE. The participation of Macrorregião 2, the most vulnerable, promoted 
inequality. As with PIB, there were different effects from those presented by the 
macroregion in relation to regions and UFs. 
 
Conclusion 
 The percentage distribution of FDL among macroregions, regions and UFs, can 
be an important indicator for evaluating the provision of public sports and leisure policies 
in the Brazilian State. If the percentage distribution of FDL follows the PIB, the economic 
activity could have impact in the distribution of the FDL, in order to promote the 
maintenance of the inequality. If the percentage distribution of FDL follow the percentage 
distribution of FPE, the sports and leisure public policies could contribute to the reduction 
of inequalities. 
 These results are important, to define the participation of the Union, in the 
provision of public policies that reduce inequality in Brazil. As resources are finite to 
public sports and leisure policies, the decentralization of Union resources, towards the 
UFs, must take into account their funding capacity. 
 The H1 has not been confirmed for Macroregion 1, and the H2 has not been 
confirmed for Macroregion 2. The results of this work, are between reproducing 
economic inequality, and making a breakdown of public resources, in order to offer 
greater equity, there is an important space through which it has passed. Instead the 
analysis being performed with aggregated period data, does not mean that a year-by-year 
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 For the more developed regions, South and Southeast, the effect of FDL compared 
to PIB was non-reproduction of inequalities. However, when compared to PEF, the effect 
points to the maintenance of inequalities. The North and Northeast regions, despite 
participating with a percentage higher than PIB, which is a good sign in the reduction of 
inequalities, did not reach that referring to the distribution of PEF. Considering at this last 
criterion, the effect was toward maintaining inequalities. 
 Although do not exist constraints at the federation level, that pressure UFs to be 
responsive about investing in FDL, they have shown appreciation for the agenda. FDL's 
investment adherence level was 100% in the period. Therefore, there is recognition that 
the sports and leisure agenda should be part of the political concerns of the UF 
governments. 
 A relevant conclusion of the study concerns the fact that UFs, indistinctly, 
contribute to resources in areas that are not guaranteed by federation rules. Additionally, 
the UFs presents continuously investment, as well as, guaranteed increasing resources, 
generating the investment stock in FDL (comparison between the year of entry and exit). 
 The analysis of the states behaviour, regarding to the investment in FDL, allowed 
an improved understanding of the financing of public sports and leisure policies in Brazil. 
However, the continuity of the agenda requires complementary analysis, in order to 
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